

AD-A264 052



DTIC

LECTE

4AY 1 3 1993

C

D

2

STUDY  
PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**COSMETICS OR RADICAL SURGERY?  
WHAT'S RIGHT FOR THE TOP LEVELS OF THE  
U.S. DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT AS IT DOWNSIZES?**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAL R. ROBINSON**  
United States Army

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:**

Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited.



USAWC CLASS OF 1993

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

93-10549



47pg

93 5 11 21 6

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Root Hall, Building 122 Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Cosmetics or Radical Surgery? What's Right for the Top Levels of the U.S. Defense Establishment as It Downsizes?					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) LTC Michal R. Robinson					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Study Project		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 93/04/15	
15. PAGE COUNT 40					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) <p>Our nation's leaders should break out of the current military roles and missions; debate and consider a more comprehensive restructuring of the U.S. defense establishment. In the face of the substantial downsizing now occurring, and likely to continue, the time is right for a major reorganization of the top levels of the U.S. Armed Forces. The purpose of this paper is to show why this is necessary and to suggest one way it might be done.</p> <p>The paper addresses: why the paradigm of roles and missions for independent services is increasingly dysfunctional; why change is needed, particularly organizational structural reform; what can be learned from some of our allies who have reorganized their military establishments; what corporate experience may suggest, based on the experience of large U.S. corporations which have successfully downsized; and who might be the agent of change.</p>					
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Colonel Duane E. Williams, Project Adviser			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (717) 245-3845		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCAA

## USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

### COSMETICS OR RADICAL SURGERY? WHAT'S RIGHT FOR THE TOP LEVELS OF THE U.S. DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT AS IT DOWNSIZES?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Michal R. Robinson

Colonel Duane E. Williams  
Project Advisor

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public  
release; distribution is unlimited.**

U. S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

DISCLOSURE INSTRUCTIONS 1

## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Michal R. Robinson, LTC, USA

TITLE: Cosmetics or Radical Surgery? What's Right for the Top Levels of the U.S. Defense Establishment as It Downsizes?

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1993 PAGES: 40 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Our nation's leaders should break out of the current military roles and missions debate and consider a more comprehensive restructuring of the U.S. defense establishment. In the face of the substantial downsizing now occurring, and likely to continue, the time is right for a major reorganization of the top levels of the U.S. Armed Forces. The purpose of this paper is to show why this is necessary and to suggest one way it might be done.

The paper addresses: why the paradigm of roles and missions for independent services is increasingly dysfunctional; why change is needed, particularly organizational structural reform; what can be learned from some of our allies who have reorganized their military establishments; what corporate experience may suggest, based on the experience of large U.S. corporations which have successfully downsized; and who might be the agent of change.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	ii
Introduction.....	1
Why We Should Change.....	3
Senator Nunn's "Four Air Forces" Speech.....	5
Why Not Just Proportionate Downsizing?.....	7
But Why Reorganization?.....	8
Irrelevance of Independent Services.....	11
The Relevance of Unification.....	13
Learning From Our Allies.....	17
The Canadian Experience.....	17
The British Experience.....	20
U.S. Corporate Experience.....	23
How We Might Change.....	25
Broad Goals of Reorganization.....	25
One Possible Reorganization.....	27
Elimination of the Military Departments.....	27
Establishment of a General Staff.....	28
Defense Agencies.....	29
The Old Services.....	30
Major Commands.....	31
Service Uniforms.....	32
Unified Command Plan.....	33
Pros and Cons.....	34
Conclusions.....	36
Who Might be the Agent of Change?.....	37
Endnotes.....	39
Bibliography.....	41

## INTRODUCTION

Our nation's leaders should break out of the current military roles and missions debate and consider a more comprehensive restructuring of the U.S. defense establishment. In the face of the substantial downsizing now occurring, and likely to continue, the time is right for a major reorganization of the top levels of the U.S. Armed Forces. The purpose of this paper is to show why this is necessary and to suggest one way it might be done.

The paper will address:

- ◇ why change is needed, particularly organizational structural reform;
- ◇ why the paradigm of roles and missions for independent services is increasingly dysfunctional;
- ◇ what can be learned from some of our allies who have reorganized their military establishments;
- ◇ what corporate experience may suggest, based on the experience of large U.S. corporations which have successfully downsized; and
- ◇ who might be the agent of change.

Even though addressed more fully in subsequent sections, a few salient points ought to be made up front. While a model for reorganization is indeed suggested later in this paper, the important thing is not the precise model itself, but rather the rationale upon which it is based: that is, the need for reform, and particularly for organizational structural reform at the military department level and above. Most importantly, while the suggested reorganization envisions

eliminating military departments as bureaucratic entities, it must be quickly added that this is not to suggest that the military services, *per se*, should be eliminated. They should not. Each of our military services is vital to our national military security. Yes, overlaps in service functions do exist. But at the same time, each of the services performs **unique and vital** functions — none can be eliminated without grave jeopardy. Finally, while this paper falls into the "military reform" *genre*, the underlying assumption here is not that the military is ineffective and in need of complete reform. The success of the U.S. military in the Gulf War, while not an unqualified success, nonetheless clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of our armed forces. The U.S. military is without equal in the world today. The purpose of this paper is to suggest how we might retain that effectiveness and at the same time achieve a more rational and efficient organization, ultimately resulting in even greater effectiveness.

Having made this last point, it must be added that there are indeed many things that could be done to improve our national defense. Congressional reform, overhaul of our defense acquisition policy, and realignment of the Active Component/Reserve Component mix come immediately to mind. By suggesting the particular change that it does, this paper does not negate the validity of other proposals, some of which could conceivably result in even greater efficiencies and improvements in effectiveness. But the scope of this paper must necessarily be limited, and the proposal that is presented is considered a fundamental one.

## WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE

One assumption and one substantial fact underlie this paper's call for fundamental change in our defense organization, particularly at its top levels. The fact, discussed more fully below, is that joint warfare has firmly established itself in the U.S. Armed Forces. It's the way we fight<sup>1</sup> and it is here to stay. This is, in large measure, an inescapable consequence of the advanced state of technology today. While jointness is here to stay, the military management structure has not changed to fully accommodate joint operations; the administrative structure (military departments, with their manning, training, and equipping roles) and the operational structure (the Unified Command Plan and joint operations in wartime) are not entirely compatible.

The assumption is that the U.S. armed forces will shrink beyond the downsizing they are even now undergoing. This is a reflection of both the "New World Order"<sup>2</sup> and the U.S. domestic agenda. Not only did we win the Cold War, we also demonstrated our ability to successfully execute our post-Cold War military strategy by handily defeating Iraq in the Persian Gulf War. Now we must address our current and most significant threat to U.S. national security interests, which is primarily economic. Our ability to compete in world markets is a function of our domestic well-being, our fiscal policy, how we address the issue of the Federal debt, the international balance of payments, our level of investment in infrastructure revival, and a host of other factors. Continued high levels of defense spending is at cross-purposes with many of these factors.<sup>3</sup> Unless a new world power develops, posing a significant threat to U.S. national survival, the U.S. political agenda will put tremendous pressure on the military establishment for continued



reduction in cost and, correspondingly, in size. Our armed forces will probably be driven much below the level of the currently championed "Base Force."<sup>4</sup> This appears to be a reflection of the will of the American people, who demonstrated in the recent presidential election that they are more interested in improving their domestic ills than they are in the international scene. Our new president was elected on a platform calling for substantial cuts to the defense budget. At the time of this writing, Congress appears to be moving towards even greater cuts.

As the U.S. military becomes relatively less important in America's overall national security agenda, it will be scrutinized ever more closely and will have to respond to increasing demands for improved efficiency.<sup>5</sup> The challenge for the military will be to maintain effectiveness at the same time it increases efficiency. Aside from external calls for efficiency, it should be clear that increased efficiency will allow the military to maintain as much combat power as possible in the face of budget cuts.

### Senator Nunn's "Four Air Forces" Speech

Another significant fact that bids change is the July 1992, speech by the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC).<sup>6</sup> Senator Sam Nunn's speech, commonly referred to as the "four air forces speech," gets at the efficiency issue from a different angle. Mr. Nunn began his speech with a discussion of the establishment of the Department of Defense and how it fell short in achieving unification; he then discussed the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (G-N) as an important step in creating "a coherent, efficient, and effective Defense Establishment," but one that leaves much to do to "complete the process of reform." He acknowledged that G-N addresses, in a limited way, the issue of the assignment of roles and missions to the military departments. But the requirement for reform goes beyond more tightly constrained service roles. Nunn calls for reshaping, reconfiguring, and modernizing our overall forces, stating, "We must find the best way to provide a fighting force in the future that is not bound by the constraints of the roles and missions outlined in 1948."

Mr. Nunn appears to be talking about breaking the paradigm of service roles and missions altogether. His remarks certainly call for more than simply reviewing roles and missions. Such a review, with the intention of more tightly specializing the services and reducing redundancy and overlapping missions, is indeed appropriate. But this is really less significant in its import to the military departments than his remarks concerning the services' command structures *and administrative and management organization*. This points directly at the military departments.

While not included here, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Nunn's speech gives his rationale for change, along with many examples of the duplication in roles and missions and redundancy of forces and activities that he calls to eliminate. The reader who is not satisfied with the arguments in subsequent sections of this paper may want to read Mr. Nunn's speech in its entirety. An even better reference is found in an issue brief by the Business Executives for National Security, which has an excellent discussion of this issue, with a good historical perspective and many illustrative examples of how the services operate as independent fiefdoms.<sup>7</sup>

This author believes that Mr. Nunn is calling for nothing less than a complete restructuring of the Department of Defense. (This opinion was bolstered by comments made by a Senate Armed Services Committee staffer at the Army War College's Fourth Annual Conference on Strategy on February 25, 1993.) In Senator Nunn's testimony before the Senate he indicated the magnitude of the restructuring he proposes: "In all probability, it will take anywhere from 2 to 5 years." Such a time-line would seem to indicate more than minor tinkering with roles and missions.

## WHY NOT JUST PROPORTIONATE DOWNSIZING?

Aside from this call from one of the most influential leaders in Congress, not to mention indications for change from the new President and his new Secretary of Defense, why should we change our military organization? After all, with the organization we have today we won the Cold War and successfully faced a major regional contingency in the Persian Gulf; why mess with success? Why can't we just trim a little more here and a little more there, if indeed we must further downsize? Why must we fundamentally change our system? The one answer is simple. We have too much overhead and it costs too much. We have succeeded, but at a cost that we can no longer afford, given domestic realities and international economic competition. One of the persistent criticisms leveled by defense reformers since WW II is the resultant huge defense bureaucracy. Even if the peak size of our military forces required such a huge bureaucracy, surely the size to which we are even now cutting our forces under the Base Force does not warrant the size of the bureaucracy remaining above. And the Base Force is being considered for further cuts. Retaining unnecessary overhead will result in disproportionate pressure to further reduce the fighting forces, as additional cost-reductions are sought in the future. If we must cut, let's start at the top, eliminating the fat of the bureaucracy before we cut the muscle of the fighting forces. Put another way — facing the realities of much reduced funding in the future — how can we achieve as "big a bang for the buck" as possible? We must find a way to keep as much warfighting capability as possible; one obvious way is to cut out as much management overhead as possible.

## BUT WHY REORGANIZATION?

There is another, not so obvious reason for change that points towards structural reform. And it's really the more important reason. In his testimony before Congress, Senator Nunn referred to comments made by Admiral Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Crowe said, in answer to the question of why we are always prepared to fight the last war, we always follow a war with a two-step downsizing process. The first step is to cut the budget, which we always do, and reduce the fighting forces accordingly. The second step is to rationalize the structure, which we never manage to get around to doing. When the next war comes along, we find ourselves with the old structure we had in the last war. In the absence of structural reform now, the U.S. armed forces will find themselves well prepared in the next war to fight the Soviets or even the Iraqis, but they will not likely be the current threat.

The importance of structure can be seen in the way in which the U.S. Navy recently reorganized. Announced 22 July 1992, the reorganization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations staff was a part of the Navy's overall plan to realign functions parallel to the Joint Staff.<sup>8</sup> But it did much more. A Navy Times article says it all very well:

"In essence, the reorganization of the Navy's top operational staff recognized that with a shrinking defense budget, the Navy could no longer afford feuding, disparate fiefdoms — air, submarine, and surface — competing for a smaller slice of the Pentagon pie.

"So they reduced the power and size of the fiefdoms, and added a fourth warfare community — amphibious and mine warfare, to emphasize the increased importance of these two capabilities — and put them all under a new budget and warfare requirements czar, Vice Admiral William A. Owens, who reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations... 'Reducing the strength and stature of the old platform communities of surface, air and submarine is also bringing more cross-pollination between communities,' Owens said."<sup>9</sup>

In the same way, at the next higher level in Defense, we can no longer afford to have the present services competing for a "smaller piece of the Pentagon pie," especially not when many outside Defense are clamoring to make that pie even smaller still, in the face of our burgeoning Federal deficit. The Congressional Budget Office has suggested that policy actions, not process changes, are the key to reducing the Federal budget deficit.<sup>10</sup> Many of its proposals for policy actions involve eliminating various military programs. The fact is, eliminating any one of a wide variety of weapons systems programs would indeed save billions of dollars. But why do many of these programs get to the advanced stages that they do in the first place? Why do we have separate services consuming vast resources in the development of competing weapons systems?

An underlying thesis of this paper is that structure breeds policy. If this is doubted, one has only to consider how government reacts when it wants to signify an increase in the importance of a program. It elevates the program's relative standing in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The agency with high standing in the bureaucracy will command greater resources. Therefore policy changes, by themselves, are not the key to reducing the deficit, in so far as the defense contribution is concerned. Contrary to the proposals of most defense reformers, it is the rationalization of the organization that will result in the kinds of policies that lend themselves to efficient and effective defense. Mr. Les Aspin apparently understands this, in light of his proposed reorganization of the Department of Defense (DoD).<sup>11</sup> It is aimed at organizing the DoD within the framework of the current strategic environment facing the U.S. In that context it is a more rational

organization for the formulation of strategy appropriate for that environment. But it misses the roles and missions dilemma entirely and is not likely to facilitate the rationalization of our defense establishment in the face of downsizing.

If we don't heed Senator Nunn's call for rationalizing the defense organization at this time of downsizing, we will be committing the same error that we have habitually made. Unfortunately, it appears that is precisely what we are doing. The latest publication of the "Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States"<sup>12</sup> calls for very little change in the status quo.<sup>13</sup> That comes as no surprise to many; what may be surprising is the assertion that the paradigm of roles and missions, within the context of the current military departments, is fallacious anyway. Adjusting roles and missions only treats the symptoms, not the disease.

## IRRELEVANCE OF INDEPENDENT SERVICES

(The evils of "servicism"—too much focus on separate service interests<sup>14</sup>—are well covered in a number of defense reform references published since 1947 and especially since the mid-1980s. These will not be repeated here, for the most part. The interested reader is referred to the bibliography, especially to the works of Art, Millis and Thompson cited.)

There was a time when an independent navy and an independent army were logical aspects of U.S. national military strategy. A maritime strategy (i.e. U.S. security equals command of the sea) was unquestionably required prior to World War II. Ironically, the relevance for such independent components of national military strategy, particularly for the U.S., was no longer rational at just the time that such a concept was used to justify, successfully, the establishment of the U.S. Air Force as an independent service. Air power as the "decisive instrument of war" fueled the drive for an "Independent Air Force."<sup>15</sup> Such a rationale was probably incorrect at the time, given the state of military technology, and has unquestionably become increasingly so in the intervening years.

The fact is, technology has largely resulted in the irrelevance of service strategies as they have come to be known.<sup>16</sup> Today's modern weapons and platforms don't inherently belong, for the most part, to a navy or an air force or an army. And U.S. national security does not rest singly or principally on domination of any medium, air, sea, or land. Airplanes, either ground-based or ship-based, can fly over ships, yet cannot seize and hold terrain. Armies can accurately shoot missiles deep into enemy territory, at ranges achieved only by air forces of



yesterday. Army helicopters provide close air support to ground forces. Navies can launch aircraft from their aircraft carriers, ICBMs from their submarines, and cruise missiles from both their submarines and surface ships. The point is, assigning roles and missions to military departments, based on weapons, weapons platforms, or equipment in general, results in artificial and arbitrary distinctions. Conversely, a military department can no longer define itself in these terms. With respect to warfighting, the paradigm is broken; military departments, as anything other than administrative bureaucracies, are irrelevant.

But beyond their irrelevance, the fundamental problem with strong services advocating their particular brand of warfare (or weapon or platform) as "the ultimate strategy" is that the best strategy is not achieved. What is best for America is lost in the din of interminable competition and wrangling between the services. Often what results is a watered down strategy, duplication of forces and weapons systems, and compromised operations plans (we **must** have marines in this operation). While no assertion is made that operations plans were compromised, even during the Gulf War we saw a determination on the part of the services to ensure a major role for themselves. This was no doubt driven, at least in part, by a desire to prove the utility of their forces in the post-Cold War era and thus justify a bigger share of the smaller Pentagon pie.<sup>17</sup> Wise allocation of resources, particularly to acquisition, is often held hostage by political forces that ride the raucous train of interservice rivalry. And the defense budget is usually divvied up among the services in rough parity, often to the detriment of programs that really are needed but won't be funded to the extent required by the threat, because it would result in one service getting

more than it's "fair share." This was all well and good, as long as the pie was large enough that we could afford duplication (whether necessary, as argued by the services, or not). The basic assumption of this paper, as stated earlier, is that the pie will get so small that we must not only change the way we cut it; we must also change the way we mix the ingredients. We must complete the unification process.

### **The Relevance of Unification**

An understanding of the relevance of unification of the services was apparent to many in defense circles at the conclusion of WW II, (actually, much earlier)<sup>18</sup> and was an underlying assumption in the establishment of the Department of Defense. Unfortunately, the services were too powerful and the resulting National Security Act of 1947, and its amendment in 1949, did not go far enough in achieving the degree of unification dictated by the nature of modern war. And the subsequent Reorganization Act of 1958 and the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols), while moving inexorably in the right direction, have not yet achieved that necessary degree. What is called for now in this evolution of our defense establishment is a more substantial restructuring of the military departments themselves — really, a shift in their relative standing in the defense establishment hierarchy — at the same time redefining their relationship to the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both of which must also change in order to implement this fundamental shift. As referred to earlier, such a shift in relative standing was made by the Navy in its recent reorganization. The current services are analogous to the Navy's former platform fiefdoms. By pushing them down in the hierarchy,

their relative importance and power is diminished to the overall health of the organization as a whole.

The relevance of unification today is apparent in the joint warfighting doctrine of today's U.S. Armed Forces. The problem is that the military departments' administrative organizations have not kept pace with the development of modern warfare. The lines between the services' current roles and missions have become blurred to the point of disappearing. The departments have sought to maintain their independence<sup>19</sup> and autonomy in a continual quest for institutional security, often at the expense of national security. The nonbeliever has only to consider the Navy's new strategy, "...From the Sea," to appreciate this fact.<sup>20</sup> The Navy, joining forces with the Marines, has showcased a naval strategy that justifies the retention of large numbers of aircraft carriers and emphasizes the importance of naval forces as the forces of choice in the post-Cold War era. It's not the intention to criticize the Navy here. Even before we saw "...From the Sea," the Air Force was emphasizing its importance in its own white paper, "Global Reach—Global Power."<sup>21</sup> All the services can be expected to act in ways that preserve their institutions. But at some level, we must rise above the interests of the individual services and consider the national security and how that can be most effectively and efficiently achieved. This is the underlying fact behind Senator Nunn's assertion in his "four air forces speech": "The fundamental question is not what is best for the individual services. The question is what is best for America?"

Given the assumption of continued downsizing and the fact of joint warfighting, the question is how to accommodate these realities while maintaining as strong a defense capability as possible. More force cuts

are inevitable, but the starting point should be to achieve maximum administrative and bureaucratic efficiencies before resorting to further force reductions. Therein lies one of the most salient aspects of unification. The economies of scale achieved are relatively more significant, the smaller the total force. So a substantial amount of money is saved up front, but the savings increase geometrically as the forces are further reduced. And when it comes to further cutting forces, the better the new organization can achieve integration of forces (i.e. improved joint warfighting), the more potent will be the resultant combat capability.

But before proceeding, the concept of unification of the services and consolidation of the military departments must be explained. First it is important to assert that the objective of restructuring would not be to eliminate services, *per se*. One of the lessons learned by the Canadians in their integration is that service identification — perhaps most represented by the distinctive uniform — is important to morale and esprit. The fact is, we need airmen, and soldiers, and sailors, and marines -- they have distinct identities and they do unique and quite necessary things.

However, that identity does not reside principally with a military department, which is essentially a bureaucracy. The fact is, service men and women often identify with their skill or specialty (Both the Army soldier and the Marine can say, "I'm an infantryman."); with their weapons platform (Both the Navy and Marine officer would say, "I'm an F-18 jockey."); or with the medium of warfare ("I'm a seaman or airman.") more than with their department. What this says is that these identities — and their attendant morale and esprit — can be maintained

in a restructured organization that may not include Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

So to fully exploit the potential of joint warfare, we want to integrate these various specialties — warfighting capabilities — in a way that promotes their unique characteristics while at the same time eliminates their wedding to institutions — the military departments — that represent parochial interests that often compete for resources in counterproductive ways, ultimately resulting in inefficiencies. No longer would there be departments that would insist on having their own this and that, representing a compulsive need to maintain independence and autonomy. It is at this level that we see overlapping functions, force structure and weapons systems.

But could we have effective armed forces without separate military departments? Is this such a radical or crazy idea? The Canadians and the British don't seem to think so. They have successfully integrated in ways that seem to have relevance to our armed forces.

## LEARNING FROM OUR ALLIES

### The Canadian Experience...

#### What they did...and why

Canada's 1964 White Paper on Defence cited the Royal Commission on Government Organization report on the Department of National Defence:

"...rapid development of defence technology as further diminishing any value or significance of the individual services as independent entities.

"...the relative size of the 'administrative tail' (budgeting, accounting, supply, general administration) growing steadily in all military forces...

"...a rapid increase in the technical content of the work, a large element being common to all three Services (among their operational elements themselves).

"Consequently, there is a growing range of activities of common concern to the Services, for which the traditional basis of organization is unsuited. It is increasingly recognized that to maintain three separate organizations for such functions is uneconomic...It is the opinion of your Commissioners that effective consolidation cannot be based on joint control by the three Services with the object of preserving the traditional responsibility of the three Chiefs of Staff for the control and administration of all the Armed Forces."

The government decided on the "integration of the Armed Forces under a single Chief of the Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff," with the goal of developing "a single unified defence force for Canada." This goal was realized through the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act of 1966, which eliminated the separate services (The National Defence Act of 1950 had resulted in a single Minister of Defence), creating a single service, and established new field commands under the Canadian Forces Headquarters: Mobile Command, Air Defence Command, Maritime Command, Air Transport Command, Training Command, Materiel Command, Reserves and National Survival, NATO Air Division, and NATO Brigade Group. Later, in a subsequent National Defence Act, the Department of National Defence and the Defence Staff were

amalgamated and the field commands, now known as operational commands, became the Maritime Command, Mobile Command (later changed to the current Land Forces Command), Air Command, Canadian Forces Europe, Canadian Forces Northern Area, Canadian Forces Communications Command, and the Canadian Forces Training System.

### **How it worked...How it is today**

Contrary to the common misperception of the U.S. military about Canadian unification, it is alive and reasonably well today. Ask a high ranking U.S. officer and he or she will likely say that the Canadians have gone back to their separate services. While they have indeed gone back to what they call "distinctive environmental uniforms," they have not undone unification. That's not to say that all is rosy; unification was a very painful process and there are still residual problems, almost thirty years after the process was begun.<sup>22</sup> The Canadians went too far and too fast.

Things were not well explained to the troops and morale suffered. In the confusion that resulted, effectiveness no doubt suffered. Many mistakes were made — some things were done for the wrong reasons. They used a cookie cutter approach, trying to integrate everything and make everything in their former services alike. They have since undone some things that didn't work out, most noticeably, bringing back service uniforms. Most importantly, in some of the undoing, the Canadians have reaffirmed the uniqueness of some aspects of the services and the need for a separation of some of their elements.

Today, at the top of their defense organization, the Canadians have a single Department of Defence (DND), which includes a single Defence

Staff; they have no service ministries or staffs. The head of the Department is an elected official, the Minister of National Defence (MND), who is a senior member of the Canadian Cabinet. The day-to-day management of the Department is left to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), a four star general, and the Deputy Minister, a senior appointed public servant. The two are co-equals and run the Department as a team, although command of the Canadian Armed Forces is vested solely in the office of the CDS. Within the DND, selected positions are dual-hatted as Joint Staff, providing staffing for operational matters.

Amalgamating the DND and Defence Staff appears to have led to at least one potentially serious problem — two separate chains of command appear to have formed, one civilian and the other military. And there is still some sorting out of who has authority to set what policy at what level.

At the bottom of the Canadian defense organization, they have successfully integrated many "trades" (military specialities) that serve across the operational commands. While they have not returned to separate services, *de facto* services do exist in the operational commands. The spirit of the former naval service resides in the Maritime Command; the army, in the Land Forces Command; and the air force, within the Air Command. This seems only natural. But the fact remains, the Canadians have successfully eliminated the bureaucratic entities of the services, with all the administrative overhead and the powerful political aspects inherent in their former services. The bottom line is the Canadians have achieved unification of their armed forces,



achieving efficiency and effectiveness through a defense structure that is stable, with no significant, immediate changes contemplated.

### **The British Experience...**

#### **What they did...and why**

The British have had a unified Ministry of Defense since 1963. But it was not until 1984 that they created a unified staff at the national level. The Central Organisation for Defence, a White Paper<sup>23</sup> presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence in 1984, followed a major review of the British defense establishment. This review stemmed from British recognition "that future policy for each Service must be increasingly within a common defence framework." Their experience in the Falklands Campaign, indicating a greater need for integrated operations, was the principal fact behind this recognition.<sup>24</sup> But their review was prompted not only by operational-level considerations. It also sought to "achieve the best possible value in defence terms from the resources devoted to defence," especially in light of the substantial and increasing proportion of Britain's national resources being devoted to defense.

#### **How it worked...How it is today**

The result of the review was the creation of a unified Defense Staff. It eliminated the Service Vice Chiefs of Staff and rolled the greater part of the Service staffs, for which they had been responsible, into the central military staff of the Defence Staff. The British, known for their ability to create large, intricate bureaucracies, have actually pared down their military bureaucracy. They no longer have large

service departments within or under the Ministry of Defense. Most of the things done by both the U.S. Military Departments, the Service staffs, and the Joint Staff, are all done within their single Ministry of Defence.

That is not to say that the British have eliminated their military services, as the Canadians have done. The British do indeed have separate, distinct military services. And each service has its own single service board, headed up by a chief (Chief of the General Staff, Chief of the Air Staff, and Chief of the Naval Staff). Just as in the U.S. military, these chiefs are proponents for their respective brands of warfare. The main difference is in relative size and power. The British service boards are miniscule; compared to the U.S. service staffs and the military department staffs that number in the thousands, theirs number in the tens -- two orders of magnitude smaller, while their services are only a single order of magnitude smaller. Since the British service boards are not responsible for establishing equipment requirements, they don't play in the power games of the budget process to the degree that the U.S. services do. Perhaps because of this, but certainly as a reflection of their limited political power, the boards do not include political appointees.

In fact, in the entire MOD, there are only three political appointees: the Secretary of State for Defense, the Minister of the Armed Forces and the Minister of Defense Procurement. And these Ministers must have been elected to Parliament before the Prime Minister can appoint them to their MOD positions. Therefore they could be expected to represent a broader constituency than might be represented by political appointees, such as the U.S. service secretaries.

The current British defense organization is probably not without its faults. It does seem a little complicated to the outsider. (But probably no more so than the U.S. defense establishment would seem to a Brit.) From the inside, there is criticism on the one hand that unification has not gone far enough and, on the other hand, that unification has resulted in a loss of service identity. The purpose here is not to conduct a comprehensive critique of the British defense establishment. The point is, in terms of military services and their often competing interests, the British seem to have achieved a balance at the policy-making level. And they have streamlined their bureaucracy, eliminating some unnecessary duplication and bureaucratic overhead in the process.

The British have also carried unification down to operational levels, achieving economies through the consolidation of many logistics and administration activities as well (just as the U.S. is increasingly doing.)

Before considering a specific plan for reorganization, there is one other body of experience that may be useful to the U.S. military as it faces downsizing.

## U.S. CORPORATE EXPERIENCE

Preliminary findings of an on-going Strategic Studies Institute study of corporations undergoing downsizing may have some applicability to the U.S. military.<sup>25</sup> It must be quickly emphasized that warfighting is not a business — criticisms of the military's attempts to "incorporate" defense, stemming from the McNamara era, are legion — yet we can learn from "corporate America" and apply some of its principles to the armed forces. The recent and still ongoing downsizing of many of America's largest corporations can tell us something about successfully resizing an organization as large as the Defense Department. If we can do this in a way that fully takes into account the nature of warfare and the special needs of an organization that prepares for war and fights it when necessary, we should do so. Some potentially pertinent findings from American corporate experience follow.

Downsizing creates uncertainty, which resulted in conservatism in all the corporations studied. This leads to the conclusion that restructuring during downsizing is least desirable if creative approaches are sought, which indeed they ought to be. Unfortunately, the downsizing of the U.S. military has already begun. If we recognize the potential for conservatism, perhaps we can at least partially overcome it.

Successfully downsized corporations reduced their structures through "cross-functional reductions" — the removal of staff layers. This finding points directly at the possible utility of removing the layer of military department staffs.

Successfully downsized corporations clearly communicated purpose and direction to employees. This was a finding of the

Canadians, who recognized this as a lesson learned from not having done this well during their unification process.

Successfully downsized corporations cut deep and fast. That is, they didn't piecemeal it. This is not necessarily a contradiction of the Canadian's lesson learned after having restructured too quickly. A well considered and communicated master plan, with necessary cuts scheduled in an orderly fashion, could be the best of both worlds. The point is to avoid the prolonged uncertainty and the cloud of doom that it brings.

Successfully downsized corporations avoided the "row harder" syndrome — they cut out doing things, rather than trying to continue doing all the things they had previously done when they had a larger workforce. This lesson would seem to have applicability to both the TDA Army and the TOE Army. We must prioritize functions and eliminate those low priority functions that cannot reasonably be supported by the smaller workforce.

## HOW WE MIGHT CHANGE...

### Broad Goals of Reorganization

Considering the aforementioned calls for change, the arguments for reorganization, and the experience of our allies and corporate America, what goals might be appropriate as a specific reorganization is envisioned?

The fundamental goal is to improve efficiency without loss of effectiveness, or at least with limited loss of effectiveness. In some cases, effectiveness could be expected to improve. For example, some operations are no doubt more effective than those duplicated in another part of the organization. By identifying and successfully adopting the most effective of like operations throughout the organization as a whole, overall effectiveness would be improved. Consider also, when more than one agency is responsible for the same purpose, the purpose is often not achieved at all because of the artful dodging that bureaucracies can be capable of — if everyone is responsible, ultimately no one is responsible.

Equally fundamental is the goal of reorganizing in a way that support organizations and management parallel the operational structure to the extent practical. Along this line, reorganization should be result in greater unification, promoting jointness.

Another general goal of restructuring would be to create an organization that can make better decisions, ultimately resulting in savings far beyond any initial savings, if any, that may be achieved by the streamlining itself. One way this can be done is by streamlining the organization, eliminating unnecessary layers of management. Policy recommendations are often watered down or otherwise distorted as

they work their way up through a bureaucracy. And of course, the more layers, the longer it takes to arrive at a decision.

A difficult to achieve but nonetheless important goal would be to eliminate unnecessary activities. Let's face it, some things we do are no longer necessary, and some were of marginal importance at their inception. This will require courageous leadership in making some tough decisions.

A final, broad goal would be to transition to the new organization with minimal disruption and with minimal startup costs. This goal might best be supported by the development of a solid, long range master plan that ensures a well-phased transition. For example, if it's decided to eliminate one of two duplicative activities, phase out the workload of the one rather than move it to the other. Also, by agreeing to a master plan early in the process, morale-reducing uncertainty can be minimized. Most importantly, intervening decisions can be made that will support transition and be consistent with the objective organization.

Some general guidelines to bear in mind throughout the process would be to keep the objectives of reorganization in sharp focus so that the process is disciplined. The idea here is to avoid wholesale change for change sake or change that simply makes everything look alike for the sake of uniformity. Also, as any organization is eliminated or activities are consolidated in a new or different organization, it is important to clearly lay out the responsibilities and authorities of the new or changed organization. If a particular organization is eliminated and given functions are deemed no longer vital, make that clear so that

other organizational elements don't labor trying to "pick up the ball." This would minimize the bureaucratic tendency of accretion.

Let's now look at one way to reorganize the U.S. defense establishment which attempts to meet the above goals and guidelines and addresses the issues raised in previous sections.

## **One Possible Reorganization**

### **Elimination of the Military Departments**

While the scope of this paper does not permit a detailed description of a possible reorganization, at least a conceptual description is demanded. The first and central feature is the elimination of the military departments. This captures the most salient and relevant feature of the British and Canadian reorganizations. It is also consistent with corporate organizational experience in eliminating layers of bureaucracy in the face of downsizing. Most importantly, this defuses interservice rivalry at the level that it is most pernicious. Along with civilian secretaries and secretariats, the military chiefs of staff and their service staffs would also go. Obviously, some things done in the current military departments, regardless of how small the services might become, would still need to be done. (But a rigorous assessment must be done — no doubt some, if not many, activities can be eliminated.) In general, policy functions and business matters would move up to a reorganized and greatly streamlined DoD. Operational functions would move to the Joint Staff. This is consistent with recent restructuring by both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. The Navy's restructuring sought to align its staff with that of the Joint Staff. And the Air Force sought to clean up the line between the Secretariat and the Air Staff,



moving business matters into the former and operational matters into the latter.<sup>26</sup> The Air Force, in its reorganization, sought to undo its headquarters' migration away from those basic activities directed by DoD: "...to set policy; evaluate program guidance; plan, program and budget; and allocate and distribute resources." While focusing the Pentagon staff on these functions, the Air Force also sought "streamlining and delayering the organization." The DoD must do the same, a fact recognized by the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Les Aspin.<sup>27</sup>

### **Establishment of a General Staff**

Although not central to the argument of elimination of the military departments, the Joint Staff should probably become a general staff, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff redesignated as Chief of Staff of the United States Unified Armed Forces (USUAF) General Staff and given executive authority. This is essentially where we are today, in all practicality, in the wake of G-N, which gave increased power to the Chairman (but not executive authority.) The intention here is not to threaten civilian control of the military; there is no question about the wisdom of civilian control. This would be preserved through the National Command Authorities' inherent authority to direct the Armed Forces in their execution of military action. The President has authority over the Secretary of Defense, who currently has authority over the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and would continue to have authority over the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; this relationship would not change. (What should change is the current artificial relationship between the combatant commanders-in-chief of the unified

commands and the Chairman. Currently the Chairman cannot officially give them orders directly; he can only "transmit" the orders of the Secretary and the President. Obviously, the President, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, could override the orders of the new Chief of Staff. But the Chief ought to be able to give the combatant commanders orders directly.

### **Defense Agencies**

Below DoD and the general staff, the former defense agencies would be reduced in number (see "Major Commands" below) and, those remaining, streamlined to become much like the old Army field operating agencies (FOA) and old Air Force separate operating agencies (which were recently renamed FOA in the Air Force's restructuring). Those former service supporting agencies not rolled into the defense agencies would be moved under the general staff, or moved into one of the new major commands, depending on their focus. Those that do not have a warfighting focus, but more a business focus, could go directly under DoD. Perhaps the streamlined defense agencies would be renamed FOA, like the agencies they incorporated. This would contribute, in some small measure, to the objective of making them more responsive to the operators than the current defense agencies are perceived to be.

## The Old Services

The successors to the old services could be directorates or divisions within the General Headquarters. But not Army, Marines, Navy, and Air Force. What succeeds them draws from the Army's old branches, the Navy's old OP-02, OP-03, and OP-05, the Air Forces' old SAC, MAC, and TAC. It was within these organizations that warfare platforms, and the Army's analogous branches, survived as institutions. They could live on in the General Staff as the following new directorates (or divisions): Air Warfare (just as in the Air Force's new organization, but including, at that level, the Navy's old OP-05/new Air Warfare Division, N88); Air Mobility; Sea Mobility; Expeditionary Warfare; Amphibious Warfare; Sea Surface Warfare; Submarine Warfare; Space Warfare; Special Operations; Heavy Land Warfare (the old Army Infantry and Armor Branches); Air Defense From Land; Land-launched Missiles and Artillery; Combat and Construction Engineers (the old Army's, Marines', Navy's, Air Force's and Coast Guard's, all fit together, but smaller); and probably a few others. Some of these may not need to be divisions and may properly be called branches or some other organizational element, depending on relative size and importance. These divisions would represent their modes and media of warfare on the General Staff, advising the Chief of Staff. They would have backup from functional experts from the training, doctrine, logistics, and procurement and research and development communities in the new FOA and the new major commands.

## Major Commands

The emphasis of this paper is at the military department/service level, but when considering such a major change as the elimination of separate military departments, their next lower level must also be considered. Within the major commands of the services, one sees great similarities. This stems from the services' common functions as prescribed by Department of Defense Directive No. 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components." Listed below are the current major commands under each of the military departments (less operational commands, except as noted):

<u>Army</u> <u>MACOMs</u>	<u>Navy Major Shore</u> <u>Establishments</u> <sup>2</sup>	<u>Air Force</u> <u>MAJCOMs</u>
Materiel		Materiel
Training & Doctrine	Naval Doctrine <sup>2</sup>	Training
Total Army Pers <sup>1</sup>	Naval Ed & Training	Air University
Information Sys	Navy Mil Personnel	
	Telecommunications	
	Naval Data Autom	
Intelligence & Security	Intell	Intelligence
Health Services	Security Group	
Criminal Investig	Naval Medical	Special Ops <sup>4</sup>
Mil Dist of Wash	Naval Reserve	Space <sup>4</sup>
Corps of Engineers	Naval Oceanography	
Mil Traffic Mgmt	Legal Service	Air Combat <sup>4,5</sup>
	Military Sealift <sup>3</sup>	Air Mobility <sup>4</sup>

Notes: 1-Technically, not a MACOM; 2-The Navy's intended restructuring to accommodate its new strategy, as articulated in "...From the Sea," is not reflected here, except for the Naval Doctrine Command that it announced in its White Paper; 3-Navy operational command; 4-Air Force operational commands; 5-to become a part of the new joint command recommended by the Chairman, JCS, in his roles and missions review.

Under unification, these major commands would exist:

- Education & Training

- Doctrine (would include the functions of the joint doctrine center)

- Intelligence & Security (This would include the functions of the Defense Intelligence and Defense Mapping Agencies, as well as Defense's Central Imagery Office, all of which would be eliminated.)

- Personnel

- Health Services

- Investigations (this would include criminal investigations; it would obviate the need for the Defense Investigative Service, which would be eliminated.)

- Materiel (This would obviate the Defense Logistics and Commissary Agencies and would include the joint depot maintenance concept suggested by the Chairman, JCS, in his roles and missions review.)

- Communications

- (The Military Traffic Management, Sealift, and Air Mobility Commands would all fall under the U.S. Transportation Command.)

It is at the level of the major commands that most of the common functions — that really are common, for the most part — would be consolidated. This gets at Senator Nunn's "pilot training" and "helicopter training," his "consolidated medical corps, chaplains corps, and legal departments."<sup>28</sup> There are more areas than Nunn included that would fit: recruiting, supplying, equipping, maintenance, mobilizing, construction... essentially the entire list of functions.<sup>29</sup>

## **Service Uniforms**

Consideration of Service uniforms gets to a level of detail exceeding the scope of this paper, but the importance this issue achieved in the Canadian integration process suggests that it must be addressed, if only briefly. Integration of the Services is not the intent here, as it was with the Canadians, but in some elements of the newly

reorganized Armed Forces, consolidation will make Service identity difficult. In such instances, service uniform would become an issue. Where a new entity can be fairly closely related to an old Service, the men and women would retain the uniform of the old Service and most of the old customs and traditions (the Heavy Land Warfare personnel would wear Army Green, for example.) Where there is no direct link, such as in the Logistics Corps or the Chaplains or the Lawyers, they could don a new, common uniform of the USUAF (probably blue, not too different from the Navy's or the Air Force's new uniform?)

### **Unified Command Plan**

Elimination of the military departments does not demand any substantial changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP), with the exception of approval of the Chairman's recommendation to eliminate the last specified command, U.S. Forces Command, and to name a new CINC for US-based forces. This recommendation, the combining of US-based forces of FORSCOM, LANTFLT, ACC, and MARFORLANT, was the most forward-looking aspect of General Powell's recently completed roles and missions' review.<sup>30</sup> This command could be called America's Command (AMERICOM). Since the major commands under this proposed reorganization are really all unified commands, some new designation would be needed for the unified commands of the UCP. Perhaps these could be called super commands or ultra commands.

This concludes the general description of reorganization, with just enough detail to give flavor to the concept. Some pros and cons that come immediately to mind will be addressed, followed by conclusions,

including a look at who might be the agent of change in the continued unification of the U.S. Armed Forces.

### **Pros**

Improves operational control and effectiveness.

Saves money. (Although it could not readily be determined how much might be saved. It turns out that despite the huge defense accounting bureaucracy that has grown over the years, no one is keeping track of how much it costs to maintain our military department management structure.)

Reduces administrative overhead.

Takes the political power out of parochialism.

Streamlines procedures, especially decision-making.

Retains services' traditions, pride, esprit, morale.

Allows warfighters to spend more time and energy on real warfighting and less on fighting for resources.

### **Proffered Cons**

**Esprit de corps will suffer.**

Esprit is more with unit, ship, as well as with service — not with an administrative department. Also, morale is greatly related to effectiveness. If the new organization works well, morale will tend to be high. Finally, traditions, especially service uniforms, will be maintained.

### **Competition will be diminished**

Sailors will still press for more ships, airmen for more airplanes, and soldiers for more and better tanks—competition would not be lost, just contained at a lower echelon.

**Effective civilian control will be lost** — civilian control of military is so deeply embedded into our national and military psyches that there is no threat to this vital concept.

**What about the rest of the bureaucracy, primarily the Defense Department? Why shouldn't it be cut?** It should be. While little in the way of details is provided in this paper due to its limited scope, it is clear that the Department of Defense has become increasingly bloated over the years and is well overdue for streamlining.

**How could a Unified Armed Forces Chief of Staff, who may have gotten his start in, say the Army, possibly know enough about naval (or aerospace) matters to exercise executive authority?** This argument does not prevent such an officer from being a combatant commander-in-chief today and exercising command over forces of all ilk in time of war. Why should it be any more difficult in peacetime? Also, one of the side benefits that could be expected from this reorganization would be a movement of decision-making down in the hierarchy. What may have previously been decided at the military department level might now be decided in a branch or major command.



## CONCLUSIONS

Cosmetics or radical surgery — what's right for the top levels of the U.S. defense establishment as it faces downsizing? Clearly, more than just a cosmetic fix is needed. But calling the previous prescription radical goes too far. At first look it may seem radical, but it's not really. Taken in the perspective of the history of the U.S. defense establishment, and especially recent changes, including G-N, it is more evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Would services have to change that much? At the battalion and squadron level, most of these changes would be transparent. Even at the Army division level, not too much would change. Many of the changes required to implement the general concept outlined above have been taking place gradually over the last several years. Both the recent Air Force and Navy reorganizations really lend themselves to this next step. And that's really what is presented here — a next, logical step in an evolutionary process.

Overnight change is not recommended — we must go slow, but we must develop the blueprint or master plan to get there from here — we must make a commitment now. Canada went too fast. We can't — and shouldn't — do it overnight; on the other hand, we must heed corporate downsizing experience — we musn't do it in an agonizingly protracted, piecemeal fashion.

The process should be a gradual one, properly phased, but all in accordance with a master plan that needs to be developed now, along the lines of the concept plan provided above. The ultimate resizing of the defense establishment should be roughly envisioned to make the best plan, but the concept presented should work, regardless of how low we go. In fact, the smaller the force, the better it should work.

The best time to restructure is before downsizing, not after; unfortunately, we lacked the long-range vision to see the end of the Cold War and to properly anticipate the downsizing which is now well underway. Given that downsizing, we cannot afford not to reorganize. Without a new paradigm, that downsizing will take the form of the old salami-slice cuts that cut the efficient operation or activity to the same degree that the inefficient are cut. Unfortunately, it appears that is just what is happening.

Vision and courage are required. Some courageous leader must move forward and take that "...step...into the dark..."<sup>31</sup> The current lack of a significant threat, or at least the diminished threat, to our national survival gives us a little breathing room, facilitating major change. We should take advantage of this opportunity to move out smartly in developing an organization whose efficiency matches its effectiveness, one that organizes administratively along the lines that it fights — jointly.

### **Who Might be the Agent of Change?**

In Senator Nunn's "four air forces speech" he stated, "It is far better for the Department (of Defense) to accomplish this review (of roles and missions.)" But his subsequent question warned against an inadequate response: "Should we do it here in Congress? Should we form our own task force? Should we undertake a series of hearings?" No doubt there will be such hearings in any event, and perhaps a special task force as well, but it would be far better if these efforts were preceded by a serious proposal by the Department of Defense to substantially reorganize. Without such a proposal as at least a point of

departure, the Congress will devise its own plan, much less to the liking of the Services, and probably not with comparable strategic efficacy.<sup>32</sup>

Unfortunately, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, who recently concluded his statutorily required triennial review of Service roles and missions, failed to propose substantial change, aside from his recommendation regarding creation of a joint command for U.S.-based forces, as mentioned above. In area after area, he concluded that consolidation would not save money. While not known with certainty, it is likely that his analysis was based on immediate changes, for the most part, which would be costly, but ignored the long term cost-effectiveness that might be achieved through a gradual transition. General Powell must be given credit for his proposal to unify U.S.-based forces. Additionally, he recommended consolidation of depot-level maintenance under a new joint command. But his failure to rise to Senator Nunn's call for substantial consolidations across a broad range of operations is a disappointment — an opportunity missed.

The new Secretary of Defense has proposed a major reorganization of the Defense Department, but his plan does nothing to correct the systemic deficiencies that have been addressed above. Instead, it seems geared to the current state of world affairs, intended to cope more with the nonmilitary aspects of our national security strategy in the post-Cold War era.

So change is not forthcoming from within. To many, this is not surprising. As the homily goes, "the reason we have butchers is because you can't get a hog to cut itself up." It appears it will be left to Congress to carry the initiative. Mr. Nunn, the ball is back in your court...

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, JCS Pub 1 (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1991), iii.

<sup>2</sup>Charles w. Taylor, A World 2010: A New Order of Nations (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 102.

<sup>3</sup>Robert D. Hormats, "The Roots of American Power," Foreign Affairs, (Summer, 1991): 18.

<sup>4</sup>The National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, January, 1992), 19.

<sup>5</sup>Gordon Adams, The New Politics of the Defense Budget (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 30 June 1992), 13.

<sup>6</sup>Congressional Record—Senate for 2 July 1992, "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services' Roles and Missions," by the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Sam Nunn, S9559-S9564.

<sup>7</sup>Business Executives for National Security, Issue Brief No. 4: Shaping Military Roles and Missions to Secure the Newly Won Peace (Washington: Business Executives for National Security, October 1992).

<sup>8</sup>Department of the Navy, Change to the Organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), OPNAV Notice 5430 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 October 1992).

<sup>9</sup>Patrick Pexton, "Naval Strategy: Sails set for a new direction," Navy Times, date unknown, 10 & 12.

<sup>10</sup>Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options — A Report to the Senate and House Committees on the Budget, February 1993, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup>R. Jeffrey Smith, "Defense Policy Posts Restructured," Washington Post, 28 Jan 93, A4.

<sup>12</sup>Colin L. Powell, Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February, 1993)

<sup>13</sup>Rick Maze, "Too gentle, or too harsh? — Congress is cool to Powell report on service roles," Navy Times, 8 March 1993, 34.

<sup>14</sup>Robert J. Art, Strategy & Management in the Post—Cold War Pentagon. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 22, 1992), 17.

<sup>15</sup>Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 68.

<sup>16</sup>Builder, 59.

<sup>17</sup>Adams, 11.

<sup>18</sup>Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991, (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1991), 2-3.

<sup>19</sup>Adams, 12.

<sup>20</sup>Sean O'Keefe, ...From the Sea — Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century (Washington: U.S. Department of the Navy, September, 1992)

<sup>21</sup>Donald B. Rice, The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach—Global Power. (Washington, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, June 1990).

<sup>22</sup>In addition to the documents cited previously in the text, much of the author's observations and conclusions regarding Canadian unification are based on personal interviews with Canadian military personnel, to include a former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.

<sup>23</sup>In addition to the white paper cited in the text, the author obtained information from nonattributable sources within the British Army.

<sup>24</sup>British Ministry of Defence, The Central Organisation for Defence, a White Paper presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, July 1984), 1.

<sup>25</sup>The material on U.S. corporate experience in downsizing is drawn from unpublished papers of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. These papers are attributed to various authors, including Dr. Herb Barber and Colonels Dave Shaver, Herb Harback, and Doug Craft.

<sup>26</sup>Department of the Air Force, White Paper: Air Force Restructure (Washington: Department of the Air Force, September, 1991), 3.

<sup>27</sup>Smith, A4.

<sup>28</sup>Congressional Record—Senate for 2 July 1992, Sen. Nunn, S9563.

<sup>29</sup>Department of Defense Directive No 5100.1: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components (Washington: Department of Defense, September 25, 1987), 10.

<sup>30</sup>Colin L. Powell, Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February, 1993), III-5.

<sup>31</sup>"There must be, within our Army, a sense of purpose and a dedication to that purpose. There must be a willingness to march a little farther, to carry a heavier load, to step out into the dark and unknown for the safety and well-being of others." -- Creighton W. Abrams, Jr, USA Chief of Staff, 1972-1974. This quote appears on a memorial plaque in front of Root Hall, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, presented by the USAWC Class of 1974.

<sup>32</sup>Colonel David E. Shaver, Justifying the Army (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 25, 1990), 25, 31.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Gordon. The New Politics of the Defense Budget. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 30 June 1992.
- Art, Robert J. Strategy & Management in the Post—Cold War Pentagon. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute. June 22, 1992.
- Associated Press International. "Critical Report Aims at Heart of Pentagon." The Kansas City Star, October 20, 1985, p. 5A.
- Associated Press International. "Navy Shifts Strategy." The (Carlisle, PA) Sentinel. October 2, 1992, p. A6.
- Bingham, Lieutenant Colonel Price T. "The Air Force's New Doctrine." Military Review Vol. LXXII, No. 11 (November 1992): 12-19.
- British Ministry of Defence. The Central Organisation for Defence, a White Paper presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, July 1984.
- Bird, Julie. "AF-Army team set up for forcible entry." Air Force Times, October 26, 1992, p. 18.
- Bird, Julie. "Wing flap." Air Force Times, October 26, 1992, p. 14-18.
- Builder, Carl H. The Masks of War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
- Business Executives for National Security. Issue Brief No. 4: Shaping Military Roles and Missions to Secure the Newly Won Peace. Washington: Business Executives for National Security, October 1992.
- Chicago Tribune. "Joint Chiefs' (sic) Report Sidesteps Knotty Issues." 14 February, 1993, p. 8.
- Clark, Asa A. IV, Chiarelli, Peter W., McKittrick, Jeffrey S., Reed, James W., eds. The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Answers. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

- Doughty, Colonel Robert J. "Reforming the Joint Doctrine Process." Parameters Vol. XXII, No. 3, (Autumn 1992): 45-53.
- Fallows, James. National Defense. New York: Random House. 1981.
- Gabriel, Richard A. Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.
- Hadley, Arthur T. The Straw Giant—Triumph and Failure: America's Armed Forces. New York: Random House, 1971.
- Hormats, Robert D. "The Roots of American Power." Foreign Affairs (Summer, 1991).
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. JCS Pub 1. Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1991.
- Kaufmann, William W., and John D. Steinbruner. Decisions for Defense—Prospects for a New Order. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1991.
- Luttwak, Edward N. The Pentagon and the Art of War. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1984.
- Maze, Rick. "Too Gentle, or Too Harsh? — Congress is Cool to Powell Report on Service Roles." Navy Times, 8 March 1993, p. 34.
- Metz, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Force Structure for the 1990s and Beyond. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 2, 1990.
- Millis, Walter. Arms and Men. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1956.
- O'Hanlon, Michael E. The Art of War in the Age of Peace — U.S. Military Posture in the Post-Cold War World. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992.
- O'Keefe, Sean. ...From the Sea — Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century. Washington: U.S. Department of the Navy, September, 1992.
- Pexton, Patrick. "Naval Strategy: Sails set for a new direction," Navy Times, date unknown. 10 & 12.

- Powell, Colin L. Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States. Washington: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February, 1993.
- Rice, Donald B. The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach—Global Power. Washington, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, June 1990.
- Romm, Joseph J. The Once & Future Superpower: How to Restore America's Economic, Energy, and Environmental Security. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc, 1992.
- Rosen, Stephen Peter. Winning the Next War — Innovation and the Modern Military. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1991.
- Shaver, Colonel David E. Justifying the Army. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 25, 1990.
- Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Defense Policy Posts Restructured." Washington Post. 28 Jan 93. A4.
- Snow, Donald M. National Security: Enduring Problems in a Changing Defense Environment. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
- Stubbing, Richard. The Defense Game. New York: Harper and Row, 1986.
- Taylor, Charles W. A World 2010: A New Order of Nations. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992.
- The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1993.
- The White House. The National Military Strategy of the United States. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1992.
- Thompson, W. Scott, and Donaldson D. Frizzell, ed. The Lessons of Viet Nam. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977.
- Thurman, General Maxwell R. Today's Victories and Tomorrow's Army. Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, Landpower Series, No. 91-3, July, 1991.



- Tritten, James John. Our New National Security Strategy — America Promises to Come Back. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992.
- U. S. Department of the Air Force. White Paper: Air Force Restructure. Washington: Department of the Air Force, September 1991.
- U.S. Armed Forces. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991. Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1. Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1991.
- U.S. Army War College. "Selected Readings: Course 3, National Military Requirements and Capabilities: Title 10 & 32 USC Extracts and Roles and Missions Descriptions." October 26, 1992.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces; Title 32, United States Code, National Guard, and Selected Additional Provisions of Law (As Amended through April 6, 1991). Report prepared by Robert W. Cover. 102d Cong. 1st Sess., April, 1991. Committee Print 2.
- U.S. Congressional Budget Office. Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options — A Report to the Senate and House Committees on the Budget. February 1993.
- U.S. Congressional Register. Washington: Government Printing Office, July 2, 1992. The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services' Roles and Missions. Speech delivered by Senator Sam Nunn. S9559-S9565.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. Department of Defense Directive No 5100.1. Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, September 25, 1987.
- U.S. Department of the Air Force. White Paper: Air Force Restructure. Washington: Department of the Air Force, September, 1991.
- U.S. Department of the Navy. ..From the Sea — Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century. Washington: Department of the Navy, September 1992.
- U. S. Department of the Navy. Change to the Organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), OPNAV Notice 5430. Washington: U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 October 1992.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. JCS Pub 1. Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1991.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Action Armed Forces. JCS Pub 0-2. Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1986.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Command Plan, Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 Apr 92.

Washington Post. "Military Reshaping Plan Is Short of Clinton Goals." 13 February 1993, p. 1 & 4.

Weidenbaum, Murray. Small Wars, Big Defense: Paying for the Military After the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Winton, Harold R. "Reflections on the Air Force's New Manual." Military Review Vol. LXXII, No. 11 (November 1992): 20-31.